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Grain export embargoes: Are they preventable?
by Daryll E. Ray, Blasingame Chair of Excellence in Agricultural Policy, Institute of Agriculture, 
University of Tennessee, and Director of UT’s Agricultural Policy Analysis Center (APAC); 
865-974-7407; dray@utk.edu; and Harwood D. Schaffer, Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, Uni-
versity of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN.; hdschaffer@utk.edu
Russia’s Thursday, Aug. 5, 2010 announcement banning grain exports, primarily wheat, sent shock waves through the grain markets. The 
stated cause of the embargo was the drought and unusu-
ally high temperatures being experienced in Russia’s 
grain areas. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is quoted 
in an Aug. 5, 2010 New York Times article by Andrew 
Kramer as saying, “We need to prevent a rise in do-
mestic food prices, we need to preserve the number of 
cattle and build up reserves for next year.”
As a result of the heat and drought, the projection for 
the Russian grain harvest is 70 million tons, down from 
97 million tons a year earlier—a 28 percent decline. 
Domestic grain consumption in Russia is about what 
they expect to produce this year. In addition, last year 
Russia exported 21.4 million tons and held 24 million 
tons of grain in year ending stocks.
The Russian embargo could be a boon for farmers in 
the U.S., where the 2009 year ending wheat stocks were 
26.5 million tons, equal to 44 percent of production. 
Farmers in Australia and Argentina could also capture 
some of the exports that would have gone to Russia.
The reaction to the embargo has fallen into fi ve cat-
egories: 1) delight on the part of producers in countries 
that hope to capture some of Russia’s export customers 
this year, 2) discussions about global warming and the 
vulnerability of our food supply to unusual weather 
patterns, 3) the need for genetically modifi ed crops to 
deal with drought and an increasing world population, 
4) dismay over governmental interference in global 
markets, and—you may want to be sure you are sitting 
down for this one—5) a tentative call by the Financial 
Times, London, for a “strategic grain reserve to absorb 
shocks” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1ae7c962-a316-
11df-8cf4-00144feabdc0.html.
In this column, we want to take a pass on the fi rst three 
and focus on the last two.
The concern of global traders is that we will see a 
repeat of 2008, when there were food riots in over 25 
countries and a number of countries placed restrictions 
on the export of grains. The concern is that such action 
interferes with the price signals farmers need to in-
crease their production.
Quoting again from Kramer’s New York Times article, 
“Kingsmill Bond, chief analyst at Troika investment 
bank in Moscow…said, ‘grain is an emotive issue; you 
want to make sure you have suffi cient supplies.’” When 
it comes to food, most world leaders will give prior-
ity to their countries’ citizens over exports every time. 
To do otherwise is to risk a change in government, by 
force or by the ballot box.
At the same time, focusing exclusively on the impact 
on global trade implies a belief that if grain is not avail-
able in one country, due to some problem, there will al-
ways be other countries with grain to sell. In 2008, we 
saw that it is possible to experience a demand surge in 
one major producing country and production problems 
in two or more countries all in the same year, resulting 
in tight supplies.
That brings us back to the discussion of grain reserves 
and their importance in ensuring a stable supply of 
grain when countries experience either a surge in 
demand or a shortfall in production. With an adequate 
strategic grain reserve—this may actually be a set of 
national grain reserves held by both major exporting 
and major importing nations as well as an international 
emergency grain reserve for food-insecure countries—
prices will shift demand away from grain-short coun-
tries and toward countries with adequate supplies, thus 
reducing the need for embargoes.
As the Financial Times said, “the crisis of 2008 was 
the fi rst…upheaval…[in grain markets in] 30 years. 
To face a second so soon should be a wake-up call. It 
would be irresponsible to expect the benign conditions 
of the past to return.”
We don’t make a practice of including links to our pre-
vious columns, but this is one of those times when we 
feel compelled to do so. Our column # 403, published 
April 18, 2009 and entitled “How to really disrupt 
international agricultural trade, now and in the future,” 
discusses the inevitable trade interferences that arise 
from countries’ universal and overpowering desire to 
take care of their own fi rst, http://www.agpolicy.org/
weekcol/403.html.
